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JURNAL SEJARAH DAN KEBUDAYAAN ISLAM

- **Invasi Fatimiyah Ke Mesir**
Abdul Basith Junaidy
- **Kebijakan Politik Islam Hindia-Belanda: Ordonansi Perkawinan di Jawa-Madura Tahun 1929-1931**
Siti Nur Latifah
- **Pemindahan Ibu Kota Daulah Abbasiyah Dari Baghdad ke Samara Oleh Khalifah Muktasim Tahun 836 M**
Ahmad Syafie Hadi
- **Peranan Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX Dalam Pembentukan Gerakan Pramuka Tahun 1960-1961 dan Unsur-Unsur Nilai Islami di Dalamnya**
Lutfiasin
- **Revolusi Dunia: Gerakan Politik Bani Abbasiyah 98-136 H/716-754 M**
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- **Sa'ad Bin Abi Waqqas: Pemanah Kebanggaan Rasulullah SAW**
Umar Abdul Aziz
- **The Roots of the Disharmonious Relationship between Ethnic Chinese and (Indigenous) Indonesian people**
Akhmad Najibul Khairi



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PEDOMAN TRANSLITERASI

1. Konsonan

Huruf Arab	Huruf Latin	Huruf Arab	Huruf Latin
ا	tak berlabang	ط	t (titik bawah)
ب	b	ظ	z (titik bawah)
ت	t	ع	'
ث	th	غ	g
ج	j	ف	f
ح	h (titik bawah)	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	dh	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	و	w
س	s	ء	'
ش	sy	هـ	h
ص	s (titik bawah)	ي	y
ض	d (titik bawah)		

2. Vokal Pendek

Tanda Diakritik	Nama	Huruf Latin
◌َ	fathah	a
◌ِ	Kasrah	i
◌ُ	Dammah	u

3. Vokal Panjang

Tanda Diakritik	Huruf Latin
◌َ◌َ	a
◌ِ◌ِ	i
◌ُ◌ُ	u

4. Diftong

Tanda Diakritik	Huruf Latin
◌ِ◌َ	ay
◌ِ◌ُ	aw
◌ُ◌َ	u

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5. Tanwin

Tanda Diakritik	Huruf Latin
ا	an
ان	in
اون	un

Keterangan:

- Tanda tasydid (اَ) ditransliterasikan menjadi konsonan rangkap, seperti ظن /zanna/ 'menduga'.
- Artikel takrif (ال) /al-/ tidak ditransliterasikan secara asimilatif, walaupun berada sebelum nomina yang berawal dengan konsonan asimilatif, seperti الشعر /al-syi'ru/ 'syair', dan bukan /asy-syi'ru/.

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PENGANTAR REDAKSI

Jurnal ini merupakan media bagi para dosen Fakultas Adab dan Humaniora UIN Sunan Ampel ataupun media bagi pemerhati sejarah serta sebagai upaya membangun tradisi dan budaya menulis serta mengaktualisasikan nilai intelektualitasnya dalam kerangka meningkatkan kualitas dan profesionalisme civitas akademika sebagai wujud tri dharma perguruan tinggi khususnya dalam perspektif sejarah dan kebudayaan Islam.

Dalam edisi yang ke-9 no. 2, ini Jurnal Al-Manar menampilkan 7 topik antara lain : *Pertama*, Invasi Fatimiyah Ke Mesir, *Kedua*, Kebijakan Politik Islam Hindia-Belanda: Ordonansi Perkawinan di Jawa-Madura Tahun 1929-1931, *Ketiga*, Pemindahan Ibu Kota Daulah Abbasiyah Dari Baghdad ke Samara Oleh Khalifah Muktasim Tahun 836 M., *Keempat*, Peranan Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX Dalam Pembentukan Gerakan Pramuka 1960-1961 dan Unsur-Unsur Nilai Islami di Dalamnya, *Kelima*, Revolusi Dunia: Gerakan Politik Bani Abbasiyah Tahun 98-136 H/716-754 M, *Keenam*, Sa'ad Bin Abi Waqqas: Pemanah Kebanggaan Rasulullah SAW., *Ketujuh*, The Roots of the Disharmonious Relationship between Ethnic Chinese and (Indigenous) Indonesian people. Semua artikel diatas, tentunya mengacu pada kriteria dan perspektif sejarah dan kebudayaan Islam.

Tim redaksi menyadari sepenuhnya bahwa dalam penerbitan jurnal ini tentu memiliki kelemahan di berbagai perspektif, oleh karena itu kami berharap masukan, saran dan kritik konstruktif guna perbaikan dan kesempurnaan pada penerbitan edisi berikutnya.

Akhirul kalam, semoga kehadiran jurnal ini dapat bermanfaat bagi para pembaca dan kami mengucapkan terima kasih atas segala atensi semua *stake holder* terkait.

Surabaya,
September 2016

Salam Redaksi

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The Roots of the Disharmonious Relationship between Ethnic Chinese and (Indigenous) Indonesian people

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Abstract: Dalam sejarah Indonesia, hubungan etnis China (Tionghoa) dan orang-orang pribumi lebih kental diwarni suasana yang kurang harmonis daripada hubungan yang hangat nan rukun. Hal-hal sepele yang timbul akibat dari kesalahpahaman antara etnis China dan pribumi sering sekali menimbulkan kerusuhan massa yang meluas. Dalam hal ini, etnis China selalu menjadi sasaran amuk massa. Ketidakharmonisan ini sejatinya "didesain" oleh kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintahan sejak zaman penjajahan hingga Orde Baru. Kebijakan-kebijakan diskriminatif terhadap etnis China menyebabkan mereka terisolasi dalam lingkup yang eksklusif, sehingga tidak membaur dengan masyarakat lainnya. Artikel ini membahas akar pokok permasalahan yang menyebabkan etnis China dan pribumi nampak tidak harmonis.

Background

The Indonesian Chinese have lived, settled and considered Indonesia as their home for centuries, long before the arrival of the Dutch, and their number is quite significant. Ironically, they still remain in a quandary about their identity and place in the nation they call home. Across generations and localities in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese as a small ethnically distinct minority, have periodically experienced negative stereotyping from indigenous people, violence and racial discrimination across various regimes, rulers and political models. This became increasingly frequent during the final years of Soeharto's New Order. The violence has often coincided with social, political and economic change at a national level, but it has also been driven by local concerns and conflicts.

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In a multiethnic country, it is understandable if the relationship between people of different ethnic background is not easy in everyday life. However the pattern of relationships between ethnic Chinese and Indigenous people that occurred in Indonesia has involved often interminable conflict. Historical records, from the start of Dutch colonial rule until the year 1998, demonstrate that there were incalculable losses due to ethnic riots (anti-Chinese violence) in Indonesia. During the period 1996-1999, there was number of cases of violence against ethnic Chinese, at least 46 riots had occurred in several regions in Indonesia.¹ In fact many anti-Chinese riots that have occurred have been triggered by insignificant and trivial incidents, such as a misunderstanding, a traffic accident, a quarrel between group of people, a brawl between traders (mostly ethnic Chinese) with customers (indigenous).

How trivial things can cause such incidents to take place, is demonstrated by the incident in Purwakarta. November 1995, anti-Chinese riots erupted in Purwakarta, were caused only by a very trivial thing. It was alleged that a Chinese girl had stolen a bar of chocolate from a store. On 14 January 1996, a group of youths rampaged and destroyed shops and cars belonging to the Chinese. This happened after the concert of Iwan Fals, whose lyrics protest against injustice and inequality.² Anti-Chinese riots had occurred in Situbondo on 10 October 1996, although the actual trigger for the violence had nothing to do with religion (Christian) or ethnic Chinese. In fact, this was because of a young Muslim, Saleh, found guilty of blasphemy against Islam, that he had insulted the *Kiai*³ and Islam.⁴

¹ J Purdey, *Anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia 1996-1999*, (Honolulu: Univeristy of Hawaii Press, 2006), p. 219.

² Ahmad Dahana, 'Etnis tionghoa: citra buruk yang tidak pernah berakhir', in Suhandinata, J. *Wni keturunan tionghoa dalam stabilitas ekonomi dan politik indonesia*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), pp. 48-49

³ Islamic teacher and community leader.

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Similarly, riots in Tasikmalaya, 12 December 1996, which had no relation with religion or anti-ethnic factor. The main factor was triggered by a conflict between polices and student of Islam.⁵

The anti-Chinese riots in Rengasdengklok, West Java, 30 January 1997 were caused by a small conflict between an ethnic Chinese and a group of children. Cik Gweh (an ethnic Chinese) had scolded a group of children, who were beating *Bedug* (a large drum) used to call people to prayer (Bedug) at night to awaken Muslims to take sahur (having meal before fasting). Squabbling ensued between them, and ended (apparently) in peace. However, the following morning, at 7 am, suddenly a group of people surrounded the house of Gweh, before destroying it by burning it down. Cik Gweh and his family survived the attack, but the unrest spread out all over the city. The situation was very tense, with ethnic-Chinese peoples' properties looted and destroyed, which resulted in hundreds of houses and vehicles burnt. A Chinese temple and the church were also damaged. Riots spread rapidly until Bandung, the capital of West Java, also erupted into violence, especially after rumours that Cik Gweh had trampled the holy Qur'an. On September 15, 1997, a riot erupted in Makassar, due to indigenous children being beaten with a sword by a Chinese madman.⁶ Riots occurred in Kebumen, 17 September 1998, just because of squabbles between an employee and his boss. An employee, Sukirman had been scolded by his boss for spilling oil in the shop

The above events are small ripples that became the prologue to the biggest riot in the history of the Republic of Indonesia, which is the climax of the Chinese and the indigenous ethnic disharmony, the May 1998 riots. This essay will attempt to

⁴ Purdey, *Anti-Chinese violence...*, p. 42

⁵ Ibid, p. 56.

⁶ Ahmad Dahana, 'Pri and no-pri relations in the reform era: a pribumi's perspective', in Suryadinata (ed), *ethnic relations and nation-building in southeast asia*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 48.

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examine the roots of disharmonious relationship between ethnic Chinese and (Indigenous) Indonesian people and give some solutions to end that phenomenon.

Historical Roots (*The Dutch Colonial Policy "Divide Et Impera"*)

The ethnic Chinese arrival in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, began in the seventh century, and their presence has been an integral part of the Indonesian archipelago. Small Chinese settlements already existed in Indonesia, particularly in the trading ports along the north coast of Java.⁷ They integrated with local Indonesian people similar to their counterparts in various other parts of Southeast Asia. However, when the Dutch came in 17th century and ruled for about 350 years, this integration and good relationship was disrupted. The Dutch, during the colonial era, implemented the *divide et impera* policy (racial division) to maintain their existence. Based on (The Dutch Colonialist State Regulation) No. 163 IS/1854, the population was divided into 3 groups: Europeans or Westerners formed the upper class, the indigenous people formed the lower class, and in between were the Foreign Easterners or Orientals which included the Chinese, people of Arab descent, and Indians who were born in the Dutch Indies or had lived there at least ten years.⁸

As a result, there was a polarisation in society, especially among ethnic groups, natives and non-natives. Indigenous activities focused on agriculture, retail trade, government officials, and other non-economic fields. On the other hand, ethnic Chinese focused on the economy and trading. There was no communication outside the economic field between the two groups. Communication, if there was any, was

⁷ Charles Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in crisis*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 1.

⁸ Francis H Winarta, 'Racial discrimination in the Indonesian legal system: ethnic Chinese and nation-building', in Suryadinata (ed), *'ethnic relations and nation-building in southeast asia'*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 67.

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limited to the relationship between sellers and buyers, and between borrowers and lenders.⁹

Moreover, the Dutch introduced another system that implicated to separateness of Chinese, such as the Officer system, the Zoning system and the Pass system. The officer system implemented between 1619 and 1837 was aiming at forcing the ethnic Chinese to play a role as labourers as well as traders. Generally, the ethnic Chinese lived and worked in their own region, far away from indigenous inhabitants. The Dutch administration appointed a voluntary officer (mostly a Chinese businessman) in order to control the Chinese community. The role of this administrative officer was to explain the Dutch regulations and collect revenue from the community. They were also granted the rights to manage community affairs in terms of religion and customs.¹⁰ With the appointment of officers from their own community, ethnic Chinese were given the freedom to take care of themselves. But in fact the officer was no more than a tool of the colonial government to monitor the movements of ethnic Chinese, so that the government could take anticipatory steps if riots broke out.

The second system was the Zoning system (*wijkenssteseel*), implemented in 1835 when the ethnic Chinese in Java were forced to stay in their own areas, isolated from other races. This system limited the Chinese to certain regions and forbade them from living among the indigenous population. This restricted communication between them and others races. Heavy fines applied to anyone who violated this regulation. This was the beginning of the formation of Chinatowns (*Pecinan*) in almost all cities in Indonesia.

⁹ Dahana, *Emis tionghoa...* p.309

¹⁰ Leo Suryadinata, 'The state and chinese minority in Indonesia' in Suryadinata, L (ed), *'Chinese adaptation and diversity: essays on society and literature in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore'*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1993), p. 80

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The Pass system (*Passesstelsel*), a kind of internal passport system which applied only to *Foreign Orientals*, applied if an ethnic Chinese person wanted to travel out the quarters. This system was introduced in 1863 and it required Foreign Orientals travelling in Java and Madura to apply for passes valid for one year. At the end of nineteenth century, the Dutch colonialists were instructed to rigidly enforce the Pass system. From then on, the Chinese were required to obtain passes for every four days spent away from home.¹¹

The creation of racial classification by the colonial power distinguished white people from the second-class "Foreign Orientals" and the third class, and least acceptable, indigenous population. Obviously, this arrangement precluded assimilation of the Chinese and fostered the "growth of exclusiveness." Moreover, it hardened ethnic boundaries, set up walls between the Chinese and Javanese, and largely prevented Chinese from assimilating or, for example, adopting the religion of the majority of the people, Islam. Since that time, Chinese people have faced problems not only due to their separateness from the other races, for example, by having to live in specific areas with restricted access, but also gained negative stereotypes from the indigenous people who saw them as "aliens".¹² They were viewed as recent immigrants who belonged to a different racial, group, embraced a different religion, and spoke a different language.

Those are the historical roots of discrimination of toward Chinese. They have been marginalised and have felt alienated from the surrounding society by their own life experiences, not only during the Dutch colonial era, but also after the independence of Indonesia. The indigenous people still thought that they were the foreigner or aliens.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 82

¹² Leo Suryadinata, *Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese minority and china: a study perceptions and policies*, (Kuala Lumpur:Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, 1978), p. 17

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Socio-cultural and economic gap

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society which adopted the objective of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity). But the slogan is only applied to indigenous Indonesians, not to the ethnic Chinese. Since the birth of Indonesia, ethnic Chinese are still considered as 'immigrants'. They are not indigenous, but foreigners. Natives are defined as groups that have their home territory.¹³ For example, ethnic Batak, Bugis, Madurese, Javanese have their own area or land, but Chinese do not have territorial roots in the country. The Indonesian nation is seen to be owned by indigenous people, while they are not natives. Thus, even though they are a citizen, they remain strangers.

The term *pribumi* (indigenous) and *non pribumi* (non-indigenous) applied to distinguish ethnic Chinese from the indigenous people, in which ethnic Chinese were defined as *non-pribumi*. This also appeared in the 1945 original constitution article 6 and 26.¹⁴ Hence they were placed outside of the indigenous community. This biological approach were kept and nurtured throughout the period of the New Order. While other inhabitants, such as ethnic Arabs and Indians, the term non-indigenous does not seem to apply, so they do not have any difficulties in socializing with indigenous people from various ethnic groups in Indonesia. Arabs and Indian descents considered as part of the ethnic community living in certain areas.¹⁵

¹³Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesian state policy towards ethnic Chinese, from assimilation to multiculturalism?', in Suryadinata, L (ed). *Chinese indonesians. state policy, monoculture and multicultural*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), p. 4

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 11.

¹⁵ AW Adam, 'Etnis tionghoa, tidak kenal, maka tidak sayang', in Suhandinata, J. *Wni keturunan tionghoa dalam stabilitas ekonomi dan politik indonesia*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), p. 261

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Chinese people are known as people who live clustered in separate groups and regions, known as China towns (kampung Cina or Pecinan)¹⁶, and do not live together with the majority of the indigenous community. If they stayed with another community, they never came out and were not active in community activities. Consequently, the negative stereotype emerged among indigenous people in Indonesia. The stereotyping of the Chinese is demonstrated by the following lines:

The Chinese are clannish, they keep aloof socially and prefer to live in separate areas. They cling persistently to the culture of their ancestral homeland. Their loyalty to Indonesia is dubious at best; at worst they are downright hostile to Indonesia. Chinese who apparently identify with Indonesia are not genuine; they are only pretending to do so for opportunistic reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification with the country and its people. This opportunism is characteristic of people concerned with money, trade and business. They are not, like Indonesians, dedicated to ideals. Having been given a favoured position by the Dutch, the Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy, oppressing the Indonesia masses and preventing the rise of a national (i.e indigenous) entrepreneurial class. Not content with their dominant position, they also engage in economic subversion, since they are expert in bribery and smuggling.¹⁷

Coppel identified common stereotypes of the Chinese perceived by the indigenous people, along with some common Indonesian expressions: They are a homogeneous and changeless group who could not change their culture wherever and whenever they are "*a Once a Chinese, always Chinese*". They exploit our economy and are rich, "*3% Chinese control 70% of our economy*" causing the economic gap and the anger of people. They feel superior to indigenous people and are an exclusive group "*They think they are superior to us*", and live in specific districts, known as *pecinan*, separate from the indigenous people. Their loyalty to Indonesia is

¹⁶ Suhandinata, J. 2009, 'Wni keturunan tionghoa dalam stabilitas ekonomi dan politik indonesia', (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), p. 116

¹⁷ Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in crisis*, p. 6

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questionable, "*They don't mind who holds the cow as long as they can milk it*". They are reluctant to assimilate, "*They don't want to mix with us*". Most of these stereotypes are still alive and well. Although these stereotypes are mostly negative, Gosling argues (cited in Hoon, 2006, p. 84) that they are "*sometimes accurate*" in describing the Chinese and are very powerful.¹⁸

Prejudices such as these not only emerged among citizens, but also among politicians, who have an impact on the making of regulations or laws. Siswono Yudohusodo, one of the politicians from *Golongan Karya (Golkar)* party and former minister during the New Order listed nine "sins" of the Chinese that expressed his stereotypes of Chinese people:

1. They settle exclusively in a specific area.
2. Some companies have a preference to recruit people of Chinese descent.
3. In some companies, they give a high salary to ethnic Chinese employees rather than indigenous people.
4. There are some who discriminate between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Indonesians in their behaviour toward clients, in their business relations.
5. A weak social solidarity and togetherness with the ethnic Indonesians exists in their neighbourhood.
6. Their nationality is weak and questionable, and assumes that Indonesia is just place to live earn living.
7. There are those who, in their daily lives, still speak Chinese and who adhere to their traditions, making no effort to speak Indonesian well, and who do not know or care about Indonesian customs.
8. There are those who view their Indonesian citizenship as legality only.

¹⁸ Hoon, Thesis for the degree of doctor of philosophy, The University of Western Australia, School of Social and Cultural Studies, 2006, p. 84

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9. There are those who feel superior towards other community and population groups.

However, there are common positive stereotypes of the Chinese relating to their work ethic and values: the Chinese have a high work drive, a long-term perspective, strong determination, extensive networking, they are thrifty, industrious, hardworking, diligent, disciplined, efficient, careful, rational, organised, skilful and determined.

Furthermore, the economic gap between Chinese and indigenous people has an impact on relations between them, and causes envy and discrimination. It is usually said that while Indonesia's Chinese comprise only 3.5% of the population, they control more than 70% of the Indonesian economy.¹⁹ Many have become phenomenally wealthy. The social implications of such an imbalance are obvious. However, that percentage was an excessive rate.²⁰ It is true that many people in Indonesia of Chinese descent are rich, even very rich compared to the level of income of indigenous Indonesian. However, in fact, most of them are in the poverty category. That argument was strengthened by Pandji Wisaksana, a Chinese businessman, who stated, in *Harian Bisnis Indonesia* (Indonesian daily business) on 9 August 2002, that on the assumption that the total number of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian population is 10 million, then 200 of them are big businessmen, 6000 people are middle-class businessmen, and 260 000 are small entrepreneurs living in remote areas. The rest are labourers, workers, farmers, fishermen, and street vendors living in Riau, Bangka, Kalimantan Barat, Tangerang and other cities in Indonesia.²¹

¹⁹ C Chua, 'Defining Indonesian Chineseness under the new order', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, National University of Singapore, vol. 34, no. 4., p. 465

²⁰ Y Liem, *Prasangka terhadap etnis Cina, sebuah intisari*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan dan Penerbit Pena Klasik, 2000), p. 51.

²¹ Suhandinata, *Wni keturunan tionghoa...*, p.342

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Soeharto's economic policy contributed to the rapid growth of Chinese economic power. Some of them not only do hold major economic positions, and control many of the food distribution networks, but also control the modern sectors. In designating the Chinese to the economic arena, state policies in Indonesia fostered an image of the Chinese as "economic creatures" that forced them to work only in the economic field. Soeharto's regime believed that the ethnic Chinese were traders and should be confined to that field. They were supposed to stick to their economic profession and should not move into other fields. Not surprisingly, Soeharto was reluctant to appoint any Chinese to significant political positions. There was no adequate space on the Indonesian political stage for any participation, let alone any formal opposition by the ethnic Chinese. Moreover, they were restricted from being active in government as civil servants or from entering the military service.²²

Under the "*Cukong system*" (*Cukong* is a Chinese (Hokkien) term, meaning 'master', but in Indonesia, it was used to denote a 'skilful Chinese businessmen who closely relationship with elite figures in military and politics (O.G. Roeder, cited in Suryadinata, 1973, p. 34). The ethnic Chinese business elites developed close ties with elite figures to gain the project and the military for protection from potential harassments, in return for the opportunity to expand their wealth. This practice is well-known in other Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Thailand) and represents an obvious alliance of mutual interest. A few hundred Chinese conglomerates emerged during Soeharto's rule.

Consequently, people believed that Chinese businessmen colluded with government officials to obtain business projects, robbing pribumi (native) businessmen of opportunities. The subjective impression given to the indigenous

²² Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesian state policy towards ethnic Chinese, from assimilation to multiculturalism?', in Suryadinata, L (ed). *Chinese Indonesians, state policy, monoculture and multiculturalism*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, Singapore, 2004), p. 10.

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people is that the Chinese, as a group, look for economic profit by any means. All the ugliness that occurs in the business sector will automatically be associated with ethnic Chinese.²³ Commercial success unwittingly served to demonise the Chinese and stirred up anti-Chinese sentiments, as the Chinese were identified with greed and other negative values. They were seen as villains who secured their gains through exploitation, corruption and collusion, to the detriment of the *pribumi*.²⁴ This attitude was encouraged by the action of some ethnic groups such as Eddy Tansil (The economic manipulator on the run), a boss of high-class prostitution, Hartono, and many other ethnic Chinese who embezzled Bank Indonesia liquidity assistance (BLBI) funds.

Adding to this is the settlement (*working and trading areas, religious spaces, etc*) of some Chinese in luxurious and exclusive residential areas in big cities, and their unwillingness to associate with the relatively poor and deprived society surrounding them. All these conditions combined to serve as justification for the stereotypes of Chinese people being exclusive and asocial. For example: In Jakarta, Pluit, Muara Karang were amongst known exclusive residential areas of the Chinese-Indonesians, Glodok and Mangga Dua were the Chinese trading areas, etc. In Surabaya, such as Galaxy shopping mall, *pasar* Atom (Atom market), Kawung and Dharmahusada street.²⁵

The success of the Chinese in the economic field caused envy among indigenous Indonesians. A widening economic gap and also economic difficulties resulted in ethnic and racial tension, especially anti-Chinese riots in 1998. Therefore, when the economic recession occurred, the ethnic Chinese were seen as the culprits.

²³ Adam, *Emis tionghoa, tidak kenal, ...* p. 321

²⁴ Purdey, *Anti-Chinese...*, p. 22

²⁵ Imam Syafi'i, *WNI keturunan tionghoa: mengapa selalu jadi sasaran kerusuhan?*; 'Pri-nonpri, mencari format baru pembauran, (Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1999), p.129

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When basic commodities disappeared from the market and prices soared, the ethnic Chinese traders were also blamed. The Anti-Chinese incidents were represented perhaps not an anti-China phenomenon, but rather periodic outbursts of "the poor" against "the rich". The Chinese are of course the symbol of "the rich".

The Role of Media

In this section I examine the role of media in shaping and perpetuating the stereotype of the ethnic Chinese. Generally, the discourse about ethnic Chinese that appeared in the mass media showed how the stereotype was shaped and produced via the press. Often, the press contributed to the spread of the negative stereotype, by generalising the negative attitude of one ethnic Chinese to the whole community of people of Chinese descent.

Based on the results of the KIPPAS research on media news published in Medan, it can be concluded that the press has a significant role in maintaining and supporting the emergence of stereotyping and discrimination toward Chinese. They were described by the print media as follows: They did not have the right nationalistic spirit, they lived in groups exclusively separated from the community and spoke their own language, and the media perceived ethnic Chinese as being economic animals who justify all means in the pursuit of money including bribing and colluding with the authorities.

Moreover, if an ethnic Chinese involved in a crime such as murder, smuggling, a media tend to emphasize the ethnicity. Press also used to label the ethnic Chinese based on stereotype. For example, the term *amoy*, Chinese (Hakka) term which mean a young ethnic Chinese girl. However, tabloid Aksi used this term in the headline "*Kisah tragis amoy-amoy*"²⁷ which considered a denigrating term.²⁸

²⁷ "Tragic story of amoy's", (my translation)

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News media that has covered ethnic Chinese business has also reinforced the perception of imbalance and economic disparity. *Eksekutif Magazine*, *Warta Ekonomi Magazine*, *Indonesian Business Weekly*, etc. Almost every week, such those magazines have reported the ethnic Chinese businessmen activities and their huge properties.

Government Discrimination Policy

This essay has focussed on the New Order's policies that were coloured by discrimination towards ethnic Chinese. It was these policies which led to the alienation and the separateness of the Chinese community from Indonesian society as whole.

During the New Order regime, Soeharto introduced assimilation policy to encourage an ethnic Chinese to abandon their identity, and merge with the culture of the indigenous population. He clearly stated that "*the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent should integrate and assimilate themselves into the indigenous Indonesian society (masyarakat Indonesia asli) without delay*".²⁹ For this purpose, Soeharto introduced a name-changing policy, pressurizing the ethnic Chinese to change their Chinese names to "Indonesian-sounding" names. Many ethnic Chinese have changed their names and adopted Indonesian names. This was to show or demonstrate their loyalty towards Indonesia, and it meant that their identity has merged with Indonesian indigenous people. Most of them have been using Indonesian names that reflect their Chinese original surnames: For Instance, Salim for Liem, Tano or Tanzil for Tan, Chandra for Chan. However, some ethnic Chinese have not changed their

²⁸ M Tan, "The social and cultural dimension of gender-based violence in Indonesia: from labelling to discrimination to violence, in Suryadinata, L (ed). *Chinese Indonesians, state policy, monoculture and multicultural*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), p. 55.

²⁹ Suryadinata, *Indonesian state policy towards...*, p. 2.

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name, such as Lius Pongoh (the Badminton athlete), Kwik Kian Gie (Politician), and Li Chen Wei (Economist).

Ironically, most of the New Order government policy do not support the assimilation, and tended to divide rather than unite the population. Consequently, the ethnic Chinese have failed to be absorbed into the "Indonesian community", and remained separated from the indigenous. They were marginalised and discriminated in all social spheres: culture, language, politics, entrance to state-owned school and universities, public service and public employment. This condition produced their "foreignness" and placed them in a vulnerable position of ethnic and class hostility.

Wibowo argued that it was because of the New Order applied a "stigmatisation", "marginalisation" and "victimisation" strategy toward the ethnic Chinese. The first, stigmatisation, was formulated in the decree "Circular of the Presidium of the Cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia Ampera No. SE-06/Pres.Kab/6/1967".³⁰ It was decided to prohibit the use of the term "*Tionghoa*" and replace it with an offensive and derogatory term "*Cina*". At that time, everyone knew that the word "Cina" was only used when the natives were angry and at loggerheads with the ethnic Chinese. After the issue of this regulation, many Chinese people, especially the older generation, felt insulted and that they were being treated poorly. This is despite the fact that, according to Gunarwan, the word "*Cina*" has no pejorative meaning.³¹ However, there are ridiculous word that became associated with the word "Cina", such as *Cina lu!* (Cina You!), *Dasar Cina! Or Cina Bangsa!* (Damn, Cina!), *Cina, Babi!* (Cina, pig!), *Cina, Anjing!* (Cina, Dog!). By introducing that word, the New Order clearly wanted to imply that the ethnic Chinese were not

³⁰ Wibowo, *Restrospeksi dan rekontekstualisasi masalah Cina*, (Jakarta: Penerbit PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), p. xv

³¹ Gunarwan, 'Reaksi subjektif terhadap kata cina dan tionghoa: pendekatan sosiologi bahasa', in Wibowo, I. (ed.), *Restrospeksi dan rekontekstualisasi masalah Cina*, (Jakarta: Penerbit PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), p. 48.

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favoured, and deserved to be the target of anger and hatred. They were stigmatised in society as being unpatriotic, exclusive, asocial, eating pork, and so forth.

Stigmatisation of this group was followed by a second policy called marginalisation.³² This certainly was a logical consequence of the stigmatisation phase. Because they were considered evil, the ethnic Chinese must be kept away. In the early years of the establishment of the New Order, a set of policies was issued, one after the other, which stipulated that the Chinese faction, be separate from the centre circle of the majority community.

It began with a quota system in schooling or educational institutions. Based on 7-9 of Presidential Instruction No. 37 of 1967 on Main Government Policies on People of Chinese Descent, the ethnic Chinese were allowed only a 40% quota of the total number of students, and the number of indigenous pupils per class had to be greater than the ethnic Chinese.³³ In fact, most public universities limited the number of ethnic Chinese students to 10%. In regions which had a strong Islamic influence, it was limited to 5%. The policy on school quotas was based on three assumptions: firstly, that because the quotas in public universities were very limited, the indigenous population should be given priority. Secondly, high school graduates from non-indigenous groups were considered to come from rich families, so they were seen to be able to afford to go to a private university or study abroad. Thirdly, if the non-indigenous students were not restricted, it was feared that public universities would be dominated by the ethnic Chinese.³⁴ This led to the establishment of private universities, which were usually affiliated with the Church and financially supported

³² Wibowo, *Restrospeksi dan ...*, p. xvi.

³³ Tim Lindsey, 'reconstituting the ethnic Chinese in post-Soeharto Indonesia: law, racial discrimination, and reform', in Lindsey, T and Pausacker, H, (ed.), *Chinese Indonesians, remembering, distorting, forgetting*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 56.

³⁴ Muhammad Sa'dun, *Pri-nonpri, mencari format baru pembauran*, (Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1999), p. 177

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by ethnic Chinese. As a consequence, most of the ethnic Chinese enrolled in private schools or universities that were very costly. Therefore, they were perceived by the Indonesian population as being exclusive, and as being unwilling to enrol in the state-owned school and institutions. They were seen as preferring instead to favour elite and expensive schools rather than state-owned ones.

Moreover, according to Presidential Instruction No. 49/V/IN/8/1967 and a circular letter of the Ministry Information No. 2/SE/Ditjen/PPG/K/1988, the Chinese population was prohibited from using the Chinese language, characters, and the distribution of Chinese publications was banned.³⁵ Ironically, other foreign languages such as Arabic and Kanji were allowed to be used. In 1978, the government issued the regulation that each Indonesian citizen should have *Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian Citizenship Certificate). However, in practice this regulation only applies to the ethnic Chinese.

The third policy was "victimisation." The word "*victima*" in Latin means "a sacrificial animal". The objective, then, of this policy was to make ethnic Chinese "sacrificial animals." However, this was not defined in a legal document, although it was widely practiced. For example, the Chinese community was requested to make more donations than the indigenous people. In the neighbourhood environment, they were always expected to contribute more than other community in term of social activities, Independence Day festivals or other activities. Further, in making citizen identity card or passport they have to pay more than others..

Is it because they are not Muslim?

³⁵ Lindsey, *reconstituting the ethnic Chinese...*, p. 56.

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This is an interesting factor to consider in relation to the anti Chinese riots which led to the destruction of public infrastructure and property owned by ethnic Chinese, such as shops, homes, cars and factories. The buildings that were written or signed with the word "*pribumi* (indigenous)" "*Muslim*", "Haji" (Muslim who has made pilgrim to Mecca) were more secure, and often untouched by the brutal and violent mass.³⁶ Basofi Sudirman, a former deputy governor of Jakarta, stated if the anti-Chinese riots broke out, he would invite Chinese Muslim to mediate, and he guaranteed that unrest would end.³⁷ Does that phenomenon describe that Islam is key success of the acceptance of an ethnic Chinese?

Junus Jahja was the first person who believed that embracing Islam was the best way to accelerate the process of assimilation. For this reason, he often cited the proverb '*When in Rome, do as the Romans do*'. Given that the majority of Indonesian citizens are Muslim which account for up to 80% of the entire population of Indonesia, he believes that the problem of assimilation of indigenous and non-indigenous will naturally resolve if the ethnic Chinese convert to Islam. Maulani says that all the doubts about the credibility and the loyalty of ethnic Chinese would disappear.³⁸ Similarly, Buya Hamka indicated that in everyday life, it appears that the ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam are well-accepted, and could completely assimilate with the Indonesian people.

As Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia, it seems reasonable that the Chinese community convert to Islam. It is similar to what happened in Thailand, where Chinese people converted to Buddhism, which is the dominant religion. In the

³⁶ Estiti, 'Harus kembali membangun keindonesiaan', in Sa'dun, M. (ed.), *Pri-nonpri, mencari format baru pembauran*, (Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1999), p. 85.

³⁷ Junus Jahja, *Ethnic Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia and Islam*, paper presented in International Symposium Politic - Islamic Movements in the Malay World, 2009, Taipei. p. 3

³⁸ AZ Maulani, 'ABRI, nonpri, dan integrasi sosial', in Sa'dun, M. (ed.), *Pri-nonpri, mencari format baru pembauran*, (Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1999), p. 68.

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Philippines, they became Catholic, and in Europe and America, ethnic Chinese also converted to the dominant religion, Christianity. In contrast, the majority of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia adhere to minority religions, Christianity, Buddhism and Confucianism, so they facing difficulties to assimilate and fully integrate with indigenous. Just few of them became Moslem. This is due to the ethnic Chinese perception toward Islam. Islam is a religion full of restrictions, that belongs to "backward" people, thereby becoming Muslim, they would become poor. Islam has always been associated with a praying five times a day, a prohibition of eating pork, polygamy, male circumcision and the obligatory annual month of fasting. These teachings are very difficult to be adapted with the traditional values of ethnic Chinese. Another example is, Muslim are must believe in the oneness of God. While the tradition of ethnic Chinese is that to respect the spirit of ancestors, even in certain level they have to worship their ancestors.

Similarly, Mackie has said that Islam is major obstacle to the acculturation and assimilation of ethnic Chinese, while Buddhism was attractive to the Chinese in Thailand. In Thailand there was no widespread inter-ethnic friction, no large-scale conflict, there have been no anti-Chinese riots, and no discrimination. Suhandinata, however, believes that it is not only due to the ethnic Chinese embraced the same religion as the indigenous people (Buddhism), but also it is because of many ethnic Chinese citizens have occupied high positions such as army generals, senior government officials, members of the cabinet (one even served as the Prime Minister), as well as other key positions in society. This means that the religion is not only the factor of harmonious relation between populations.³⁹

³⁹ Suhandinata, *Wni keturunan tionghoa dalam stabilitas ekonomi dan politik indonesia*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), p. 197

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Suhandinata added that religion is not the only factor disharmonious interaction between ethnic Chinese and host population. In Brunei, the Chinese population constitutes only 8.6% and although there are religious differences between ethnic Chinese (Buddhists and Christians) and Malays (Muslims), they live in peace and mutual respect. So far there has been no dissension, friction, anti-Chinese actions. This is because the standard of living is high, there is no tax, and there is no charge for education or health care for all residents.⁴⁰ However, Purdey argued if the population of ethnic Chinese much larger in some countries, disharmonious relation might be reduced. Malaysia, as an Islamic state, that has 26% of the total population relatively in peaceful condition rather than Indonesia which only 3% of the total population. Further, the ethnic Chinese were given the freedom to express their identity as Malaysians and ethnic Chinese or to participate in the nation programs, social, politic and economy.⁴¹ These could not be found in Indonesia.

Some Suggestions

Efforts to end the disharmonious relation between indigenou and non-indigenou should be encouraged by all people as this is a problem of the nation as a whole. The Indonesian government should to amend and repeal any governmental laws and regulations that have effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination and do not accord with the spirit of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity). After the fall of Soeharto there are still many laws and regulations which contain racial discrimination. One or two have been either lifted or modified but the rest remain.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ibid, 203.

⁴¹ Purdey, *Anti-Chinese violence...*, p. 27

⁴² Winarta, *Racial discrimination in the Indonesian...*, p. 73

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The constitution should be strengthened and law enforcement needs to be carried out effectively. In realizing this objective, it is necessary to changes the attitudes and mental apparatus of the population, as well as the government bureaucracy. Some of government officials or civil servants in Indonesia have bad attitude and unprofessional. Corruption, collusion, nepotism and bribery are the example of their attitude. To illustrate, despite the government has eliminated the Minister of Justice Decree No. JB. 3/4/12 Year 1978 regarding Indonesian citizenship certificate, but in practice, the government officials or civil servants are still asked the ethnic Chinese to show SBKRI in any application process related to their civil status.⁴³ This SBKRI has been used by the indigenou bureaucrats a source of revenue.

Politically, the ethnic Chinese should be active in demanding democratic rights by participating in the political field. This is not only to defend their rights, but would also constitute an attempt to be actively involved in national life. This could be done in various forms, such as participation in non-governmental organisations, as well as political and social organisations. Since the fall of Soeharto, there were a significant number of reforms in government institution, electoral and political system.

Nevertheless, engaged in the field of politics does not mean the ethnic Chinese should establish political party. However, some of the ethnic Chinese were formed political party aiming to promote racial harmony and protect their interest and rights. At least there were four political parties formed. The *Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia* (the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party), led by Lieus Sungkharisma (Li Xuexiong), followed by the *Partai Pembaharuan Indonesia* (Indonesian assimilation party), led Jusuf Hamka, an ethnic Chinese Muslim. The

⁴³ Ibid, 71.

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third is *Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia* (Indonesia citizen-nation party), founded by Tan Swie Ling. The last is *Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia* (Indonesian unity in diversity party) formed by Nurdin Purnomo (Wu Nengbin). Although, there were not an exclusively Chinese party, and set up by Chinese and non-Chinese. These parties have the similar objective, mainly are to abolish discriminatory laws, to solve economic stagnation and to provide more job opportunities as the unemployment rate was high.

Some people assessed that the establishment of such parties would not be advantageous for the ethnic Chinese, as it would lead to an exclusive attitude on their behalf as well as deepen the gulf between indigenous and non indigenous people. Paloh said that an ethnic Chinese parties are similar to snakes which look for people to hit them.⁴⁴ Ideally, it should not form parties which base on sensitive issues: ethnicity, religion, and race. Ethnic parties are a double-edged sword: they (at one time), invited the ethnic Chinese to play a role on the Indonesian political stage, yet they were formed exclusively from the ethnic Chinese community, emphasizing their separateness from the Indonesian community.

The idea of reviving an ethnic party (ethnic Chinese party) is a setback, as starting a party based on ethnicity would have a negative impact on Indonesian nation- building. Kwik Kian Gie, senior politicians and popular economist, argue that it would not be of benefit to the ethnic Chinese.⁴⁵ It would not gain a popularity on both ethnic Chinese and indigenous population. This was appeared during the election 1999, both The *Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia* (the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party) and *Partai Pembaharuan Indonesia* (Indonesian

⁴⁴ Surya Paloh, S, 'Partai tionghoa', in Sa'dun, M. (ed.), *Pri-nonpri, mencari format baru pembauran*, (Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1999) p. 107.

⁴⁵ Leo Suryadinata, Chinese politics in post-Suharto's Indonesia: beyond the ethnic approach?, *Asian Survey*, vol. 41, no. 3 (May-Jun), pp. 502-524, p. 510.

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assimilation party) were not able to participate in the 1999 election, because they were not able to have branches in half the districts in nine of Indonesia's 27 provinces.

It is better for the ethnic Chinese to active in other parties which established based on nationalism ideology. There are many ethnic Chinese become the important person in their parties, Kwik Kian Gie, Murdaya Poo, Goh Thoh Ping (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* – Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle), Alvin Lie (*Partai Amanat Nasional* – National Mandate Party), Hartati Murdaya (*Partai Demokrat* – Democrat Party). This phenomenon described that the ethnic Chinese would be well accepted if they integrate and active in political stage.

The ethnic Chinese should not be confined at economic field. On the other hand, the government should be proactive in opening opportunity to enter into the bureaucracy, the military, the judiciary and other institutions. Since the president of Habibie, this opportunity has opened for all Indonesian people without exception.

Furthermore, the ethnic Chinese should integrate and merge into the general population, both at a local and a national level. They should not be embarrassed or hide their identity. They too are children of the nation and they have the same rights and obligations. The cultural differences should be seen as gifts that enrich the nation and strengthens the existence of the nation. The small thing to do is good attitude to their neighbours (Syafi'i, 1999, p. 136). Some people say that the main factor of Rengasdengklok riots not because of Chinese or different religion, but because they never neighbourly (Purdey, 2006, p. 68). They did not try to mix or socialize with their neighbours.

Conclusion

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The disharmonious relationship between an ethnic Chinese has the roots that can be traced to the period of the Dutch colonial which divided the population into three groups which led the separation between population, especially between indigenous and the ethnic Chinese. The consequence of such segregation was the emergence of negative relationship between two groups. Prejudice and stereotyping began to dominate the relationship. The condition became worsen when the government, especially the New Order under Soeharto reinforced that the ethnic Chinese as foreign, disloyal and exploitative. Even the government forced the ethnic Chinese to assimilate, however, in practice they still being marginalised due to the government's discrimination policy towards ethnic Chinese, which continued to differentiate between *pribumi* and *non-pribumi*. Moreover, the regime rendered them the scapegoats in times of economic and political crisis.

Since the ethnic Chinese were forbade to be an active in politic and social and forced the in economic field, the voices of the Chinese community and their interest never heard by the government, and have failed to be absorbed into the "indigenous Indonesian community". Therefore, the Chinese should participate in politics at all level, especially to win high political and bureaucratic positions, as well as social activities.

The basis of integration is a consciousness of the need to maintain respect for each other, and to preserve certain values and behaviour in society. There is a need to eliminate undesirable habits, whether these derive from the indigenous or the non-indigenous population. This will lead to a harmonious relationship.

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